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THE INTERSECTION OF FEE-SHIFTING 
BYLAWS AND SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 
WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR.

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the intersection of fee-shifting bylaws and 
federal private securities fraud suits. Specifically, this Article hypothesizes 
about the effects fee-shifting bylaws would have, if enforceable, on private 
securities fraud litigation. It then turns to the validity of fee-shifting 
bylaws under federal law and concludes that they are invalid as applied to 
securities fraud claims. In light of this conclusion, this Article considers 
whether Congress should pass legislation to validate fee-shifting bylaws 
and determines that it should not.  
INTRODUCTION 
Under the “American Rule,” each party to a lawsuit pays its own 
attorney’s fees.1 Parties can, however, contract for a different 
arrangement.
2
 In that regard, a number of corporations have recently 
amended their bylaws,
3
 a document considered a contract between a 
 
 
   Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. I would like to 
thank Professors Andrew Coan, Ann Lipton, David Marcus, and Ted Schneyer and participants at the 
21st Annual Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this Article. 
 1. DAVID F. HERR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LITIGATION PRACTICE § 30:2 (2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. State corporate law requires a corporation to have bylaws. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 2.06(a) (2010) (“The incorporators or board of directors of a corporation shall adopt initial bylaws 
for the corporation.”). Corporate law provides a corporation with broad latitude as to what can be 
included in its bylaws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015) (“The bylaws may contain 
any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business 
of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its 
stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06(b) (2010) (“The 
bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision that is not inconsistent with law or the articles of 
incorporation.”). The content of a corporation’s bylaws is almost always determined by its board of 
directors. In fact, a board can normally unilaterally change bylaws whenever it so desires. I say 
“normally” because state corporate law does contemplate a board being denied the power to change 
bylaws and instead having it reside solely in the corporation’s stockholders. For example, Delaware 
law provides that a board does not have the power to change bylaws unless the corporation’s 
certificate of incorporation confers such power. § 109(a). It is standard practice for a corporation to 
include language in its certificate of incorporation conferring such power. The statutory scheme, 
however, is reversed under the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”). It provides that a board 
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corporation and its stockholders,
4
 to contract around the American Rule.
5
 
These “fee-shifting bylaws” obligate a stockholder who fails to prevail in a 
suit against the corporation to pay the corporation’s attorney’s fees.6  
Fee-shifting bylaws are a new phenomenon, bursting onto the scene in 
May 2014 following ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund.
7
 In ATP, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a fee-shifting bylaw is facially valid 
under Delaware law.
8
 Given that Delaware is the state of incorporation for 
the majority of US public companies, the opinion has received significant 
attention and promptly triggered proposed amendments to the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”). 
Fee-shifting bylaws raise issues under both state and federal law. This 
Article focuses on federal law; specifically, the intersection of fee-shifting 
bylaws and federal private securities fraud suits. Given that these suits are 
largely brought by stockholders, they fall squarely within the language of 
a typical fee-shifting bylaw.
9
 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the ATP decision and 
post-decision developments. Part II provides an overview of the federal 
securities laws most commonly invoked in private securities fraud suits. 
Part III hypothesizes about the effects fee-shifting bylaws would have, if 
enforceable, on private securities fraud litigation. Part IV finds that fee-
shifting bylaws are invalid as applied to securities fraud claims because 
such application would violate the anti-waiver provisions of federal 
securities law and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
In light of this finding, Part V considers whether Congress should pass 
legislation to validate fee-shifting bylaws and determines that it should 
not. Part VI concludes.  
 
 
can unilaterally amend a corporation’s bylaws unless the corporation’s articles of incorporation 
“reserve that power exclusively to the shareholders.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b)(1) (2010). 
 4. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(“[T]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the 
directors, officers, and stockholders . . . .”). 
 5. See infra App. 
 6. See infra Part I.C. 
 7. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
 8. Id. at 558. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
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I. ATP AND ITS AFTERMATH 
A. The ATP Litigation 
ATP Tour, Inc. (“ATP”) is the organizer of the ATP Tour, an 
international men’s tennis circuit.10 ATP was incorporated in Delaware in 
1987 as a nonstock corporation.
11
 As such, it has members instead of 
stockholders, but is governed by the DGCL, the same statute applicable to 
stock (regular) corporations.
12
 In 2007, ATP’s board of directors voted to 
restructure the ATP Tour.
13
 As part of this restructuring, ATP downgraded 
the Hamburg, Germany, tennis tournament from first tier to second tier 
status.
14
 The tournament is owned by the German and Qatari tennis 
federations, both of which are ATP members and neither of whom was 
happy about the downgrade.
15
 Thus, they sued ATP and some of its 
directors in federal district court, alleging federal antitrust violations and 
breaches of their fiduciary duties to the corporation under Delaware law.
16
 
Following a jury trial, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for 
judgment as a matter of law on the antitrust and fiduciary duty claims 
against the defendant directors.
17
 The jury then returned a verdict for ATP 
on all remaining claims.
18
 
Following its victory, ATP filed a motion with the district court 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, seeking $17.87 million in 
attorney’s fees and other costs it incurred in connection with the 
litigation.
19
 ATP based its claim for these fees and costs on Article 23 of 
its bylaws.
20
 This Article provides, in part, as follows: 
(a) In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or 
anyone on their behalf (“Claiming Party”)] initiates or asserts any 
 
 
 10. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 480 F. App’x 124, 125 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 11.  Id.; General Information Name Search, DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., 
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx (search “Entity Name” for “ATP 
Tour, Inc.”) (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 114 (2015). 
 13. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 14. Id. at 824. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 827. 
 18. Id. at 828. 
 19. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., No. 07–178, 2009 WL 3367041, at *1 (D. Del. 
Oct. 19, 2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(A)) (“A claim for attorney's fees and related 
nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be 
proved at trial as an element of damages.”), vacated, 480 F. App’x 124 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 20. Id. 
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[claim or counterclaim (“Claim”)] or joins, offers substantial 
assistance to or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against 
the League or any member or Owner (including any Claim 
purportedly filed on behalf of the League or any member), and 
(ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial 
assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming 
Party had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on 
the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the 
full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated 
jointly and severally to reimburse the League and any such member 
or Owners for all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and 
description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable attorneys' 
fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) 
that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim.
21
 
ATP argued that Article 23 entitles it to attorney’s fees because the Article 
falls within the contractual exception to the American Rule that each party 
pays its own attorney’s fees.22 The district court denied the motion.23 It 
recognized that “bylaws, as internal documents governing a corporation, 
are binding on a corporation’s board and members in most settings.”24 But 
it also pointed out that “ATP cites no case in which a court held that a 
board-adopted corporate bylaw can form the basis for the recovery of 
attorney’s fees from members who sue the corporation, much less in 
actions where the bylaws are not directly at issue in the dispute.”25 The 
court also noted that ATP adopted Article 23 after the plaintiffs became 
members and, given the timing of enactment, possibly to deter members 
from bringing suits to challenge the ATP tour restructuring at issue in the 
case.
26
 The court also observed that “[a]llowing corporate antitrust 
defendants to adopt bylaws that would impose attorney’s fees on members 
who unsuccessfully—but without bad faith—file an antitrust suit would 
likely have a chilling effect on the filing of meritorious actions.”27 It thus 
concluded that “[p]ermitting corporations accused of anticompetitive 
 
 
 21. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014) (alteration in 
original). 
 22. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 2009 WL 3367041, at *2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at *3. 
 25.  Id. 
 26. See id. at *3, *4 n.4. 
 27. Id. at *4. 
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conduct to enforce bylaws with such potent deterrent potential would be 
antithetical to the purposes of the Sherman Act.”28 
ATP appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for attorney’s 
fees to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
29
 The Third Circuit read the 
district court’s ruling as preemption based; specifically, that “federal law 
preempts the enforcement of fee-shifting agreements when antitrust claims 
are involved.”30 It then concluded that federal preemption was not ripe for 
decision because “there has been no determination of whether Article 23.3 
is valid (therefore, enforceable) under state law.”31 Thus, it remanded the 
case back to the district court to make such a determination.
32
 
Following remand, ATP asked the district court to certify four 
questions related to the validity of a fee-shifting bylaw under Delaware 
law to the Delaware Supreme Court.
33
 The district court granted the 
request, and the Delaware Supreme Court “accepted the certified questions 
based on principles of comity.”34 The questions were as follows: 
1. May the Board of a Delaware non-stock corporation lawfully 
adopt a bylaw (i) that applies in the event that a member brings a 
claim against another member, a member sues the corporation, or 
the corporation sues a member (ii) pursuant to which the claimant is 
obligated to pay for “all fees, costs, and expenses of every kind and 
description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and other litigation expenses)” of the party against which the 
claim is made in the event that the claimant “does not obtain a 
judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and 
amount, the full remedy sought”? 
2. May such a bylaw be lawfully enforced against a member that 
obtains no relief at all on its claims against the corporation, even if 
the bylaw might be unenforceable in a different situation where the 
member obtains some relief? 
 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 480 F. App’x 124 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 30. Id. at 126. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 128. 
 33. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., No. 07–178, 2013 WL 4478033, at *1 n.1 (D. Del 
2013). The Delaware Constitution provides the Delaware Supreme Court with jurisdiction to hear and 
determine questions of law certified to it by other Delaware courts, including the district court. DEL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). 
 34. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014). 
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3. Is such a bylaw rendered unenforceable as a matter of law if one 
or more Board members subjectively intended the adoption of the 
bylaw to deter legal challenges by members to other potential 
corporate action then under consideration? 
4. Is such a bylaw enforceable against a member if it was adopted 
after the member had joined the corporation, but where the member 
had agreed to be bound by the corporation’s rules “that may be 
adopted and/or amended from time to time” by the corporation’s 
Board, and where the member was a member at the time that it 
commenced the lawsuit against the corporation?
35
 
The court addressed each certified question in a May 2014 unanimous en 
banc opinion. In analyzing the first question, the court stated that “[t]o be 
facially valid, a bylaw must be authorized by the . . . (DGCL), consistent 
with the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, and its enactment must 
not be otherwise prohibited.”36 The court found that the DGCL permits a 
fee-shifting bylaw that “allocates risk among parties in intra-corporate 
litigation”37 because it falls within the DGCL requirement that a bylaw 
“relat[e] to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and 
its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, 
officers or employees.”38 It then noted that a “corporate charter could 
permit fee-shifting provisions, either explicitly or implicitly by silence,”39 
and that “no principle of common law prohibits directors from enacting 
fee-shifting bylaws.”40 Thus, it held that “[a] fee-shifting bylaw, like the 
one described in the first certified question, is facially valid.”41 The court 
then noted that corporate bylaws are “contracts among a corporation’s 
stockholders”42 and thus concluded that a “validly-enacted bylaw would 
fall within the contractual exception to the American Rule.”43 
The court, however, cautioned that “[w]hether the specific ATP fee-
shifting bylaw is enforceable . . . depends on the manner in which it was 
adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked. Bylaws that 
may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if adopted or used for 
 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 557–58 (footnote omitted). 
 37.  Id. at 558. 
 38. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (quoting Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010)). 
 43. Id. 
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an inequitable purpose.”44 It then answered the second certified question in 
the affirmative, subject to the foregoing limitation.
45
 The court, likewise, 
affirmatively answered the third certified question. Notably, it stated as 
follows: 
Legally permissible bylaws adopted for an improper purpose are 
unenforceable in equity. The intent to deter litigation, however, is 
not invariably an improper purpose. Fee-shifting provisions, by 
their nature, deter litigation. Because fee-shifting provisions are not 
per se invalid, an intent to deter litigation would not necessarily 
render the bylaw unenforceable in equity.
46
 
The court did not otherwise address what would constitute an improper 
purpose in the fee-shifting bylaw context.
47
 
Finally, the court also answered the fourth certified question in the 
affirmative. Specifically, it stated that if a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation empowers its board of directors to adopt or amend bylaws, 
as contemplated by DGCL Section 109(a), “stockholders will be bound by 
bylaws adopted unilaterally by their boards.”48 
In sum, the court held that a fee-shifting bylaw is enforceable under 
Delaware corporate law unless the corporation adopted it for an improper 
purpose. A purpose of deterring litigation is not necessarily improper, and 
whether the bylaw was adopted after the plaintiff became a 
member/stockholder is not relevant to the analysis. Other than the 
forgoing, the court provided no guidance on distinguishing between a 
proper and an improper purpose with respect to a fee-shifting bylaw, 
presumably leaving it to the lower courts to flesh out.
49
 
Note that the fact that ATP is a non-stock corporation is not significant. 
The court’s opinion was grounded in statutory analysis of DGCL 
 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 560. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See id. The court did mention some situations where it or the Chancery Court invalidated and 
upheld various bylaws, but none of these situations are particularly analogous to one likely to arise 
when a corporation adopts a fee-shifting bylaw. Id. at 558–59. 
 48. Id. at 560 (quoting Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956 
(Del. Ch. 2013)).  
 49. At the 42nd Annual Securities Regulation Institute held in San Diego from January 26–28, 
2015, Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court purportedly stated in regards to ATP that: 
“the Court was only responding to narrow questions posed to the Court by the federal district court 
considering the underlying case. The Court merely determined that the board has ‘legal authority’ to 
adopt such a bylaw. . . . The context in which the provision was being applied was not before the 
Court.” Mike Gettelman, Delaware CJ Strine (and Others) Weigh-In on Fee-Shifting Bylaws, MIKE 
GETTELMAN’S BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/member/blogs/gettelman/.  
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provisions that are applicable to both stock and non-stock corporations.
50
 
Note also that the court did not address the specific language of the ATP 
bylaw because it was not necessary to do so in answering the certified 
questions, and furthermore the court did not have a fully-developed factual 
record before it.
51
  
B. The Aftermath 
A little over a month after the ATP decision, the Corporation Law 
Council, a committee of the Delaware State Bar Association, drafted, and 
Delaware legislators introduced, Senate Bill 236 of the 147th Delaware 
General Assembly which included an amendment to the DGCL “intended 
to limit applicability of [the] holding [in ATP] to non-stock corporations, 
and to make clear that such liability may not be imposed on holders of 
stock in stock corporations.”52 Specifically, the bill proposed adding a new 
section 331 to the DGCL providing as follows: “Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this chapter, neither the certificate of incorporation nor 
the bylaws of any corporation may impose monetary liability, or 
responsibility for any debts of the corporation, on any stockholder of the 
corporation . . . .”53 While there initially appeared to be sufficient support 
for the amendment, its consideration was postponed in the wake of 
objections to the amendment from the Chamber of Commerce and other 
business groups, specifically that fee-shifting bylaws provide a useful 
means for reducing frivolous litigation.
54
  
As a result, the Corporation Law Council drafted a replacement bill. 
This bill contained DGCL amendments similar to those of the original bill 
but with more specificity and narrower in application. Specifically, 
corporations would be prohibited from including in their certificates of 
incorporation or bylaws “any provision that would impose liability on a 
 
 
 50. But see 1 DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.03 
(2015) (“Although the ATP opinion is based on statutory provisions and common law principles 
applicable to stock and non-stock corporations alike, given the unusual facts and procedural context, 
the scope of the opinion’s holdings—and, importantly, the enforceability of such a bylaw as to stock 
corporations, either ‘facially’ or in any particular circumstances—is as yet unclear.”). 
 51. See ATP, 91 A.3d at 555 (stating that “we cannot directly address the bylaw at issue”). 
 52. S. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Jonathan Starkey, Chamber Forces Delay on Fee-Shifting Legislation, NEWS J. 
(June 10, 2014, 1:52 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2014/06/10/fee-
shifting-bill/10280791/; see also S.J. Res. 12, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014) (calling 
“upon the Delaware State Bar Association, its Corporation Law Section, and the Council of that 
Section, to continue examination of important proposed amendments to the [DGCL] relating to fee-
shifting bylaws and other aspects of corporate litigation”).  
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stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any 
other party in connection with an intracorporate claim, as defined in § 115 
of this title.”55 Section 115 defines “intracorporate claims” as “claims, 
including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a 
violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder 
in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the 
Court of Chancery.”56 Note that these changes do not expressly prohibit 
fee-shifting bylaws to extra-corporate claims, which, presumably, include 
those under the federal securities laws. This is in contrast to the 
prohibition in the original proposed amendments, which was not limited to 
intracorporate claims. The Council’s written explanation for the adopted 
amendments does not address why it decided to add the intracorporate 
limitation.
57
  
Notwithstanding the seemingly inevitable legislative response, at least 
fifty-one corporations adopted fee-shifting bylaws or charter provisions 
between May 8, 2014 (the date of the ATP opinion) and June 24, 2015 (the 
date Delaware’s governor signed the DGCL fee-shifting amendments into 
law).
58
 Of these adoptees, forty are Delaware corporations and eleven are 
non-Delaware corporations.
59
 See the Appendix at the end of this Article 
for some details.
60
 
C. A Typical Fee-Shifting Bylaw 
While there is some variation among the provisions of the adoptee 
corporations, the following provision from the bylaws of Insys 
Therapeutics, Inc. (“ITI”), a Delaware corporation whose stock is traded 
on the NASDAQ Global Market,
61
 is typical: 
 
 
 55. DEL. CORP. LAW COUNCIL, AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 8 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING 
TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (2015) (proposing legislation), available at http://www. 
delawarelitigation.com/2015/03/articles/commentary/delaware-proposes-new-fee-shifting-and-forum-
selection-legislation/. 
 56. Id.  
 57. See Francis Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Legislation, 
DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2015/03/ 
articles/commentary/delaware-proposes-new-fee-shifting-and-forum-selection-legislation/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U2SR-QQEF. 
 58. See infra App. 
 59. See infra App. 
 60. For convenience, unless the context otherwise requires, references in this Article to fee-
shifting bylaws includes fee-shifting charter provisions. 
 61. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 4, 2014).  
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Section 50. Litigation Costs. To the fullest extent permitted by law, 
in the event that (i) any current or prior stockholder or anyone on 
their behalf (“Claiming Party”) initiates or asserts any claim or 
counterclaim, including any derivative action brought by or in the 
right of the corporation (“Claim”) or joins, offers substantial 
assistance to, or has a direct financial interest in any Claim 
against the corporation and/or any director, officer, employee or 
Affiliate of the corporation, and (ii) the party bringing the Claim 
does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, 
in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each 
Claiming Party that initiated or asserted the Claim or joined, offered 
substantial assistance to, or had a direct financial interest in the 
Claim shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the 
corporation and any such director, officer, employee or Affiliate 
of the corporation, the greatest amount permitted by law of all fees, 
costs and expenses of every kind and description (including but not 
limited to, all reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation 
expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the 
corporation and/or any director, officer, employee or Affiliate of the 
corporation may incur in connection with such Claim. For purposes 
of this Section, “Affiliate” of the corporation shall mean any person 
or entity that directly, or indirectly through one or more 
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common 
control with, the corporation.
62
 
The Board of Directors of ITI added this provision to its bylaws in 
November of 2014.
63
 ITI’s SEC filing disclosing the change does not 
specify why it was made.
64
 
The provision tracks ATP’s fee-shifting bylaw fairly closely, with 
“stockholder” substituted for “member” since, as a stock corporation, ITI 
has stockholders instead of members.
65
 It also clarifies the reach of the 
provision by specifying it applies to claims against the corporation and 
“any director, officer, employee or Affiliate of the corporation” (ATP’s 
bylaw is not particularly clear on this point).
66
   
 
 
 62. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Nov. 10, 2014). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at exhibit 3.1.  
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Some additional points about the ITI bylaw: 
 It provides for one-sided (or unilateral) fee shifting. 
Specifically, it requires a stockholder to reimburse the 
corporation, directors, officers, etc. for their fees and expenses 
unless the stockholder prevails but does not require the losing 
parties to reimburse a prevailing stockholder. 
 It applies to “any claim or counterclaim” by a stockholder. 
Thus, for example, it applies to breach of fiduciary duty claims 
brought directly or derivatively against the corporation’s 
directors under Delaware law and fraud claims brought against 
the corporation under federal securities law. In other words, it 
ostensibly applies to claims under both state law and federal 
law. Notably, the ATP litigation involved claims under both 
state law (breach of fiduciary duty) and federal law (antitrust 
violations). Nonetheless, the Delaware Supreme Court did not 
address this aspect. It simply labeled the litigation as “intra-
corporate” without explaining what it meant by the term.67 
 It provides for joint and several plaintiff liability on fee-
shifting obligations. As a result, the lead plaintiff in an 
unsuccessful class action could be ordered to pay the entire 
defense tab. 
 A plaintiff must prevail on the merits to avoid being obligated 
to pay the defendants’ fees and expenses. Hence, a plaintiff 
would still owe fees under the bylaw even if he or she 
negotiates a favorable settlement, because in such a case, the 
plaintiff will not have won on the merits. Certainly a 
corporation could agree to waive or reduce a stockholder’s 
obligations under the bylaw as part of a settlement, but the 
 
 
 67. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014). To be fair, the 
Delaware Chancery Court in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. includes an 
excerpt from an article defining intra-corporate disputes as disputes pursuant to the internal affairs 
doctrine. 73 A.3d 934, 960 n.129 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, 
The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political 
Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 370, 373 (2013)). This excerpt also characterizes a securities fraud claim 
as not intra-corporate. Id. ATP did not expressly address whether a fee-shifting bylaw can apply to 
extra-corporate claims, so I consider it an open issue. But see Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: 
The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2015) (arguing that charter and bylaw provisions apply only to a corporation’s internal affairs and 
therefore not to extra-corporate claims).  
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bylaw undoubtedly provides a corporation with additional 
leverage in settlement negotiations. 
 Not only must the plaintiff win on the merits, it also must 
receive a judgment that “substantially achieves, in substance 
and amount, the full remedy sought.” The bylaw leaves it to 
the courts to discern what “substantially achieves” means. 
 An attorney bringing a claim on behalf of a stockholder 
seemingly falls under the definition of “Claiming Party” and is 
therefore also arguably potentially obligated to pay the 
defendants’ fees and expenses. However, this reading seems to 
be a real stretch given that basic principles of contract law 
apply to bylaws, and the attorney neither consented nor 
bargained for being subject to the bylaw. In other words, there 
is no mutual consent or consideration and therefore no basis by 
which the attorney is bound.
68
 
In sum, the ITI fee-shifting bylaw, as is the case with the ATP fee-shifting 
bylaw and those adopted by most of the corporations listed in the 
Appendix, is extremely one-sided in favor of the corporation. 
The extreme one-sidedness of the bylaw is underscored by comparing 
it to the fee-shifting provision recently added to the Oklahoma General 
Corporation Act. Oklahoma was the first state to address fee-shifting in its 
corporate code. The statutory provision states as follows: 
In any derivative action instituted by a shareholder of a domestic or 
foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon final 
judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the 
prevailing party or parties the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as a result of such action.
69
 
Notice that the provision provides for two-sided fee-shifting, applies only 
to derivative actions, does not require the prevailing party to substantially 
achieve the full remedy sought, and applies only if the litigation goes to 
final judgment. In in other words, it is much more balanced than the ITI 
fee-shifting bylaw. 
 
 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981); see also Strougo v. Hollander, 
111 A.3d 590, 592 (Del. Ch. 2015) (noting in the bylaw context that “a non-party to a contract is not 
bound by the terms of that contract”). 
 69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126(C) (2014). 
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II. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
As mentioned above, this Article focuses on the potential implications 
of fee-shifting bylaws on federal securities laws. In that regard, this Part 
provides an overview of the provisions most implicated.  
A. Overview 
The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) are the primary federal securities 
law statutes. A core theme of both these acts is disclosure. In that regard, 
the Securities Act generally requires most public offerings to be registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
70
 A company—or 
more precisely, the “issuer”—registers an offering by filing a registration 
statement. Pursuant to SEC regulations, a registration statement must set 
forth, or incorporate by reference,
71
 various disclosures about the issuer 
and the offering. These disclosures include audited financial statements, 
comparative selected financial information, and a detailed description of 
the issuer’s business, properties, intended use of offering proceeds, 
transactions with management, legal proceedings, and executive 
compensation.
72
 As part of the offering process, the issuer must make 
available to the public the prospectus for the offering.
73
 A prospectus is a 
subpart of a registration statement, and it comprises the bulk of the 
required disclosures.
74
 The policy behind the registration and prospectus 
requirements is to provide potential investors with a standard package of 
information about the issuer and offering so that they can make informed 
investment decisions.
75
 
 
 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 71. “Incorporate by reference” means that the required information is not actually set forth in the 
document but instead it contains a cross reference to some other SEC filing by the company that 
contains (or will contain) the required information. 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 3:73 (2015). 
 72. See id. §§ 6:21, 6:23.  
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b). 
 74. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM S-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 4–6 (2016) (specifying contents of a prospectus). 
 75. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (citing A.C. Frost & Co. v. 
Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941)) (“The design of the [Securities Act] is to protect 
investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment 
decisions.”). 
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The Exchange Act is generally focused on secondary trading markets. 
On the disclosure front, it requires public companies
76
 to prepare and file 
with the SEC annual and quarterly reports disclosing financial results, risk 
factors, and executive compensation. A public company must also file a 
current report typically within four business days of the occurrence of 
various events.
77
 Triggering events include entering into or terminating a 
material definitive agreement, entering into bankruptcy or receivership, 
completing an acquisition or disposition of assets, a change in control of 
the company, departure of directors or certain officers, election of 
directors, and amendments to the company’s charter or bylaws.78 The 
policy behind these reporting obligations is to provide investors access to 
information they can use to make informed trading decisions (the reports 
are accessible on the SEC’s website shortly after filing).79  
B. Antifraud Provisions 
The above disclosure obligations are negatively reinforced by antifraud 
provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act; specifically, 
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act
80
 and section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 of the Exchange Act,
81
 among other provisions.
82
 Under section 11 
of the Securities Act, an investor in a public offering can sue the issuer, its 
chief executive officer, its chief financial officer, its directors, and the 
underwriters of the offering if it turns out that the issuer’s registration 
statement contained a material misstatement or omission.
83
 Likewise, 
 
 
 76. In this context, a public company is one that has securities registered under the Exchange 
Act. A company is required to register securities under the Exchange Act if (1) the securities are listed 
on a national securities exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b) (2014); (2) the company has $10 million or more 
in total assets and a class of equity securities held of record by (a) 2,000 or more persons, or (b) 500 or 
more persons who are not accredited investors, id. §78l(g); or (3) the company has filed a registration 
statement under the Securities Act that became effective, id. §78o(d). Thus, essentially any company 
with publicly traded securities will have to register the securities under the Exchange Act and thereby 
become subject to the Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements.  
 77. See, e.g., 1 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 71, §§ 6:31, 6:33. 
 78. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K 4–21 (2014). 
 79. See, e.g., 1 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 71, § 12:27. 
 80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2) (2014). 
 81. Id. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 82. Other provisions in the Exchange Act prohibit the solicitation of proxies by means of 
materially false or misleading statements. See Securities Act section 15 and Exchange Act section 20 
which, in certain circumstances, impose joint and several liability on controlling persons of issuers 
who have violated the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t. 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2014). Technically, the civil liability provisions of the federal securities 
laws require an untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
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under section 12(a)(2), an investor can sue the seller of securities if the 
prospectus contained a material misstatement or omission.
84
 Neither claim 
requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant acted with a particular state of 
mind; however, with the exception of the issuer who is strictly liable, a 
defendant can avoid liability under both antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Act if he performed a reasonable investigation or due diligence 
of the issuer and the offering.
85
  
A company faces potential liability under §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 of the 
Exchange Act if its Exchange Act reports or other information it releases 
to the marketplace are not accurate and complete. 
As explained by the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo: 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids (1) the 
“use or employ[ment] . . . of any . . . deceptive device,” (2) “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” and (3) “in 
contravention of” Securities and Exchange Commission “rules and 
regulations.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Commission Rule 10b-5 forbids, 
among other things, the making of any “untrue statement of a 
material fact” or the omission of any material fact “necessary in 
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2004). 
 The courts have implied from these statutes and Rule a private 
damages action, which resembles, but is not identical to, common-
law tort actions for deceit and misrepresentation. And Congress has 
imposed statutory requirements on that private action.  
 
 
See, e.g., id. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2). The customary practice, which I use in this Article, is to use the 
much shorter “material misstatement or omission,” although it does not have the exact same meaning. 
 84. Id. § 77l(a)(2). To determine whether someone is a “seller” for purposes of § 12(a)(2), courts 
apply the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), with respect to 
identical language under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act. See, e.g., Wilson v. Saintine 
Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989). In Pinter, the Court held that a 
seller is the “owner who passed title, or other interest in the security, to the buyer for value,” or a 
person “who successfully solicit[ed] the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his 
own financial interests or those of the securities owner.” 486 U.S. at 642, 647. Note that the term 
“prospectus” as used in section 12(a)(2) is broader than the subpart of a registration statement labeled 
a prospectus. It includes any “document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or 
controlling stockholder.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (providing for a reasonable investigation defense); id. § 77l(a)(2) 
(providing for a reasonable care defense). 
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In cases involving publicly traded securities and purchases or sales in 
public securities markets, the action’s basic elements include: 
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); 
(2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; 
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 
(4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public 
securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction 
causation”; 
(5) economic loss; and 
(6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection between the 
material misrepresentation and the loss.
86
 
Note that § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is very broad in its reach. It applies not just 
to Exchange Act reports but to any public statements made by a company 
by whatever means (e.g., press releases, interviews, and tweets).
87
 
Furthermore, § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 applies to misstatements and omissions 
by both public and private companies, although it comes up most often in 
the public company context. Additionally, as the above quote mentions, 
courts have recognized an implied private cause of action under 
§ 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. 
Also note that section 11, section 12(a)(2), and Rule 10b-5 liability 
overlap when a material misstatement or omission appears in the 
prospectus, which is often the case given that the prospectus contains or 
incorporates by reference the bulk of the required substantive disclosure.
88
 
In such an event, a plaintiff may very well sue the company under all three 
provisions, although it is not uncommon for a plaintiff to leave off a Rule 
10b-5 claim given its more onerous elements as compared to sections 11 
and 12(a)(2). Rule 10b-5 is, nonetheless, the most commonly invoked 
liability provision because, as mentioned above, it reaches material 
misstatements and omissions by a company regardless of the medium in 
which they appear, as opposed to sections 11 and 12(a)(2), whose reach is 
 
 
 86. 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 87. See, e.g., 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 
§ 27:16 (2015) (noting that Rule 10b-5 imposes “liability and responsibility for false or misleading 
statements in connection with press releases, letters, and reports to shareholders, and the like”). 
 88. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 74, at 1, 4–6 (specifying the contents of a 
registration statement and prospectus).  
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limited to material misstatements and omissions in a registration statement 
or prospectus, respectively. 
III. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS IMPLICATIONS 
Clearly, a claim brought by a stockholder under one or more federal 
securities law antifraud provisions would fall within the language of the 
ITI or similar fee-shifting bylaw (“typical fee-shifting bylaw”) because the 
language covers “any claim” by “any current or prior stockholder.” This 
Part discusses the likely effects fee-shifting bylaws would have on 
securities fraud litigation if they so applied. The discussion is academic 
because, as Part IV demonstrates, fee-shifting bylaws are invalid when 
applied to federal securities law claims. In a sense, this Part lays the 
foundation for the analysis in Part IV. 
A. Securities Fraud Class Action Litigation 
Claims brought under section 11, section 12(a)(2), and Rule 10b-5 can 
be brought individually, but they are mostly brought as representative, or 
class, actions. As the SEC has explained: 
Since the enforcement activities of [the SEC] do not serve to make 
whole investors who have been injured by a fraudulent course of 
business and since it is economically impracticable in many 
instances for investors individually to pursue available remedies, the 
representative action appears to provide the most meaningful 
method by which their claims may be pursued and the 
Congressional policy favoring such remedies may be vindicated.
89
 
Bringing a class action requires a member of the class to agree to serve as 
the representative, or lead, plaintiff.
90
 A typical securities fraud class 
action is brought on behalf of all investors who purchased a corporation’s 
stock between the date the corporation made material misstatements to the 
marketplace and the date it made corrective disclosure (referred to as the 
“class period”). For example, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. 
(Halliburton I),
91
 a case that has twice been reviewed by the Supreme 
 
 
 89. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483–84 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (quoting amicus brief filed in 
a different case by the SEC). 
 90. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 91. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
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Court,
92
 involved a securities fraud class action suit “brought on behalf of 
all investors who purchased Halliburton common stock between June 3, 
1999, and December 7, 2001.”93 Thus, for the suit to have been brought, it 
was necessary for at least one of those individual Halliburton stockholders 
to have voluntarily agreed to serve as lead plaintiff, which Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. did.
94
 
As is well known, securities fraud class actions are commonly initiated 
by entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ firms and not a company’s stockholders.95 In 
other words, it is a law firm that seeks out a lead plaintiff following 
revelation of a corporate misdeed as opposed to a stockholder seeking out 
a law firm to bring the case. Historically, plaintiffs’ firms have had little 
difficulty convincing stockholders to serve as lead plaintiffs. This is 
because these firms take the cases on a contingency fee basis and also 
advance litigation expenses to the lead plaintiff with repayment contingent 
on the outcome of the case.
96
 Hence, lead plaintiffs incur little to no out-
of-pocket costs for agreeing to serve. At the same time, they gain benefits 
such as being able to closely monitor and control the litigation. 
Furthermore, they share in any recovery generated by the litigation.
97
 
Thus, they are willing to serve because the benefits of doing so outweigh 
the costs. 
A stockholder’s cost-benefit analysis for serving as a lead plaintiff 
would change drastically if the defendant corporation had a typical fee-
shifting bylaw in place. Specifically, the stockholder would have to take 
into account that serving as lead plaintiff would make the stockholder 
jointly and severally liable for all fees and expenses incurred by the 
corporation and its directors, officers, and employees in the litigation 
unless the class receives “a judgment on the merits that substantially 
 
 
 92. For a subsequent development of Halliburton, see Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 
(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 93. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2183. 
 94. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02–CV–
1152–M, 2008 WL 4791492 (N.D. Tex. 2008). The Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. 
later changed its name to Erica P. John Fund, Inc. See Annysa Johnson, Archdiocese Fund Part of 
Class-Action Case Against Halliburton, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/religion/118549224.html. 
 95. See, e.g., ANDREW J. PINCUS, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS? 10 (2014), available at http://www.instituteforlegal 
reform.com/uploads/sites/1/Securities_Class_Actions_Final1.pdf. 
 96. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (2013) (providing that “a lawyer 
may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the 
outcome of the matter”). 
 97. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An 
Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2006). 
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achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought.”98 These 
litigation costs could easily reach into the millions of dollars.
99
 Hence, it 
seems extremely unlikely that a stockholder would be willing to serve as a 
lead plaintiff when the risk of being saddled with millions in litigation 
costs is factored into the analysis. This seems true even for a case where 
proving liability appears to be a “slam dunk,” given that the class not only 
has to win, but also must substantially achieve the full remedy sought. In 
other words, even a win on the merits may trigger a fee-shifting obligation 
if the plaintiff was, in hindsight, overly aggressive regarding the amount of 
damages sought. 
To be sure, other stockholders who participate in the class action would 
arguably become jointly and severally liable under a fee-shifting bylaw 
since they would have “a direct financial interest in [the] Claim.”100 As a 
result, the lead plaintiff may not ultimately be obligated to pay the entire 
fee-shifting obligation, but it would depend, in part, on whom the 
defendants decide to pursue for the fee-shifting obligation. Since a fee-
shifting bylaw provides for joint and several liability, the defendants could 
seek to collect the entire amount from the lead plaintiff. The defendants 
could, theoretically, pursue recovery from class members other than the 
lead plaintiff, but this strikes me as highly unlikely given the lead 
plaintiff’s name is on the marquee. Additionally, a lead plaintiff who is 
ordered to pay a fee-shifting obligation could thereafter seek contribution 
from members of the class since all class members are jointly obligated. 
Doing so could be unrealistic, however, depending on the financial status 
of class members, and it would certainly be time consuming and 
expensive. 
The wrinkle as to non-lead plaintiffs, or “absent” class members, is that 
they passively become class members by not opting out of the class as 
opposed to taking affirmative action to join.
101
 Hence, obligating them 
under a fee-shifting bylaw to which they presumably did not affirmatively 
consent for being part of a class for which they did not consent raises 
significant due process issues. Consequently, the defendants and lead 
plaintiff will face significant legal hurdles in collecting from absent class 
members. In other words, the entire fee-shifting obligation will likely fall 
on the lead plaintiff. 
 
 
 98. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., supra note 62, at exhibit 3.1. 
 99. See PINCUS, supra note 95, at 6. 
 100. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., supra note 62, at exhibit 3.1. 
 101. See 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9:38 (5th ed. 2015). 
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Furthermore, the lead plaintiff shoulders significant fee-shifting risk 
but divides the spoils of victory pro rata among class members after 
plaintiffs’ counsel takes its substantial contingent fee and expenses.102 This 
uncompensated fee-shifting risk even in victory creates a free-rider 
problem where a rational stockholder is likely to sit back and hope a 
fellow stockholder steps forward to be lead plaintiff, further reducing the 
likelihood of any stockholder volunteering to serve. 
B. Constraints on Shifting Fee-Shifting Risk 
An obvious workaround would be for a plaintiffs’ firm to agree in 
connection with signing up a lead plaintiff to indemnify it against any 
obligations under a fee-shifting bylaw resulting from the litigation. The 
problem with this approach, however, is that it likely violates state rules of 
legal ethics. Most states have based their legal ethics rules on the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MRPC”).103 MRPC Rule 1.8(e) prohibits a lawyer from providing 
“financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or 
contemplated litigation,” but it does allow a lawyer to “advance court 
costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be 
contingent on the outcome of the matter.”104 While I have not located any 
case law on point, it seems to me that agreeing to pay a contingent 
financial obligation of a lead plaintiff relating to a contemplated or 
pending securities fraud class action would constitute providing financial 
assistance. The arrangement could arguably constitute an advancement of 
litigation expenses, but I view this as a real stretch. The exception is 
designed to allow lawyers to cover plaintiff litigation expenses during an 
ongoing case so that a plaintiff is not denied access to the courts because 
of financial constraints.
105
 A promise to cover a contingent post-litigation 
obligation does not sound like an “advancement,” nor would a plaintiff be 
denied access to the courts in the same sense by a fee-shifting bylaw 
because the bylaw would have no financial implications until court 
 
 
 102. Note that the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, prohibit a lead plaintiff from getting more 
than its pro rata share of a recovery, although it may be awarded reasonable costs and expenses 
directly related to serving as the lead plaintiff. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A)(vi) 
(2014); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2014). 
 103. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (2013). 
 105. See id. R. 1.8 cmt. 10. 
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proceedings had concluded. Being unwilling to pursue litigation because 
of a fee-shifting risk is simply different than being unable to pursue 
litigation because of financial constraints. 
Additionally, allowing a law firm to assume plaintiffs’ potentially 
multi-million dollar fee-shifting risk would likely give it “too great a 
financial stake in the litigation,” a concern underlying both MRPC Rules 
1.8(e) and 1.8(i), which generally prohibit a lawyer from acquiring a 
proprietary interest in a case.
106
 Furthermore, a securities fraud class action 
lead plaintiff may be reluctant to discharge a plaintiffs’ firm out of 
apprehension that the firm would renege on its promise to cover the 
plaintiffs’ fee-shifting obligations. Avoiding this sort of impact on a 
lawyer-client relationship is an additional rationale underlying Rule 
1.8(i).
107
 
In sum, I suspect that the cost-benefit analysis plus the free-rider 
problem spurred by a fee-shifting bylaw eliminates the willingness of any 
stockholder to serve as lead plaintiff. Furthermore, state ethical rules likely 
prevent a plaintiffs’ firm from remedying the situation by assuming the 
fee-shifting risk on behalf of a stockholder. As a result, a corporation can 
essentially opt-out of securities fraud class actions by adopting a fee-
shifting bylaw. 
C. Securities Fraud Individual Litigation 
As mentioned above, securities fraud claims can be, and sometimes 
are, brought individually. Historically, however, the large majority of 
securities fraud claims have not been brought individually because they 
are so-called negative expected value claims—claims where the estimated 
cost of litigating exceeds the expected recovery from doing so. Take a 
straightforward example. Say you bought 100,000 shares of Acme Inc. on 
the New York Stock Exchange for $40 per share, or $4 million in the 
aggregate. As it turns out, the quarterly report Acme filed with the SEC 
the week before your purchase contained a material misstatement. 
Specifically, the report overstated Acme’s earnings per share for the 
quarter. When this misstatement came to light three weeks later, Acme’s 
stock dropped $3.00 per share as a result, meaning you suffered $300,000 
 
 
 106. Id. (“Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits . . . because such assistance gives lawyers too great 
a financial stake in the litigation.”); see also id. R. 1.8 cmt. 16 (stating that Rule 1.8(i) “is designed to 
avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation”). 
 107. See id. R. 1.8 cmt. 16 (stating that “when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the 
subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so 
desires”). 
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in damages. In other words, if you litigated your claim to final judgment 
and prevailed, you would be awarded $300,000 in damages. Securities 
fraud claims, however, are expensive and time consuming to litigate, and 
thus litigating your claim to final judgment would undoubtedly cost more 
than $300,000. As a result, it is senseless for you to pursue the claim or for 
a plaintiffs’ attorney to take it on a contingency fee basis. It becomes even 
more senseless if you factor in the vagaries of securities fraud litigation. 
Specifically, since you purchased your shares on the open market and not 
as part of a registered securities offering, you would be suing under Rule 
10b-5, which means to win you must prove scienter and loss causation, 
among other things. Proving these two elements can be difficult even if 
there is no doubt that Acme’s quarterly report contained a material 
misstatement. Thus, you would need to factor this uncertainty into your 
cost-benefit analysis. For example, if you estimate you have an 80% 
chance of prevailing, the risk-adjusted award on your claim would drop 
20% to $240,000, making it even more senseless to pursue.
108
 
If, in the above Acme hypothetical, we increase the number of shares 
you bought and/or the price drop resulting from the misstatement, you will 
eventually reach a tipping point where your claim flips from negative to 
positive expected value and therefore makes sense to pursue. Where this 
point lies in any particular case is hard to say, but given the cost, time, and 
uncertainty associated with litigating a securities fraud claim, it is likely in 
the millions of dollars of damages range. And when pro-defendant, one-
sided fee-shifting is added into the mix, this number perhaps tops $10 
million because a stockholder will now have to take into account the risk 
of having to pay the corporation’s litigation costs in addition to its own in 
the event it does not “substantially achieve” the remedy sought. The 
“substantially achieve” requirement significantly increases the uncertainty 
because, in an Acme-type situation, the corporation will argue that the 
drop in stock price was at least in part due to factors other than disclosure 
of the corporation’s misstatement. In other words, a stockholder could win 
a judgment against Acme but be awarded $2.00 instead of $3.00 per share 
because the court attributes $1.00 of the drop to, for example, a general 
decline in the market. In such a situation, the corporation will obviously 
argue that getting 66.7% of the $3.00 per share sought does not constitute 
“substantially achieving, in substance and amount, the full remedy 
 
 
 108. Of course, this negative expected value analysis has not historically hindered securities fraud 
class actions. This is because the economies of scale resulting from aggregating individual negative 
expected value claims into a class transforms the litigation into positive expected value claim. 
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sought,” thus triggering plaintiff’s obligation to pay the corporation’s 
attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting bylaw. 
Given the above analysis, it would likely be only institutional investors 
who hold large enough stock positions in companies to potentially have a 
positive expected value in securities fraud claims. For a variety of reasons, 
many institutional investors have been reluctant to pursue claims against 
companies. Instead, they typically free-ride on class actions lead by other 
plaintiffs. This approach would obviously have to change for companies 
with fee-shifting bylaws, considering such bylaws essentially eliminate 
securities fraud class actions. It does not, however, mean that previously 
reluctant institutional stockholders will suddenly aggressively pursue 
individual claims. While fiduciary duty issues may require them to take a 
closer look at bringing a claim, they are free to take a conservative 
approach in valuing a claim and apply a significant discount factor in light 
of the risk and uncertainty injected into the mix by a fee-shifting bylaw. 
The bottom line is that the impact that fee-shifting bylaws would have on 
individual securities fraud claims is unclear. My suspicion is that they 
would decrease in number because fee-shifting bylaws would significantly 
raise the damages threshold for a claim to have a positive expected value, 
thereby significantly decreasing the pool of stockholders who could 
potentially bring a claim. 
IV. VALIDITY OF FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
CLAIMS 
This Part argues that a fee-shifting bylaw is invalid as applied to a 
federal securities law claim because it (1) violates the anti-waiver 
provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and (2) is 
preempted by federal law. 
A. Anti-waiver Provisions 
Securities Act section 14 provides as follows: “Any condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to 
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and 
regulations of the [SEC] shall be void.”109 The Exchange Act contains an 
almost identical provision.
110
 As a result, a company imposed stockholder 
waiver of section 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act or §10/Rule 10b-5 
 
 
 109. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2014). 
 110. See id. § 78cc(a). 
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under the Exchange Act is void. Hence, if a fee-shifting bylaw constitutes 
such a waiver, it is invalid as applied to claims under those provisions. 
The leading case in the area is Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon,
111
 which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1987. The 
McMahons were customers of Shearson, a brokerage firm.
112
 They sued 
their Shearson broker and Shearson in federal court, alleging that the 
broker violated Rule 10b-5 “by engaging in fraudulent, excessive trading 
on respondents’ accounts and by making false statements and omitting 
material facts from the advice given to respondents.”113 As is standard 
practice in the brokerage industry, Shearson customer agreements signed 
by the McMahons included a mandatory arbitration provision that 
provided as follows: 
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy 
arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you 
for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by 
arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of 
Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the 
American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
114
 
Thus, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, and the district court 
granted the motion.
115
 
Among the issues addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the 
agreement to arbitrate fell within section 29(a) of the Exchange Act and 
was therefore invalid with respect to a Rule 10b-5 claim.
116
 The Court held 
that a contractual provision is void under section 29(a) if it “weaken[s] [a 
party’s] ability to recover under the [Exchange] Act.”117 It then concluded 
that the arbitration provision at issue in the case did not weaken the 
McMahons’ ability to recover, noting that the Federal Arbitration Act 
“establishes a ‘federal policy favoring arbitration’”118 and citing to various 
cases endorsing arbitration of Exchange Act claims.
119
 The Court also 
observed that “[i]n the exercise of its regulatory authority, the SEC has 
 
 
 111. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 112. Id. at 222–23. 
 113. Id. at 223. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 227. 
 117. Id. at 230 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)). 
 118. Id. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983)). 
 119. Id. at 232. 
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specifically approved the arbitration procedures of the New York Stock 
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the NASD, the 
organizations mentioned in the arbitration agreement at issue in this 
case.”120 It then concluded “that where, as in this case, the prescribed 
procedures are subject to [SEC] authority, an arbitration agreement does 
not effect a waiver of the protections of the [Exchange] Act.”121 
Two years later, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc.,
122
 the Court extended its holding in McMahon to section 14 of the 
Securities Act. In the process, it overruled Wilko v. Swan, a 1953 Supreme 
Court case that invalidated under section 14 the application of an 
arbitration provision to a Securities Act section 12(a)(2) claim.
123
 The 
Rodriguez Court noted that Securities Act section 14 and Exchange Act 
section 29(a) “should be construed harmoniously because they ‘constitute 
interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing 
transactions in securities.’”124 
Given the newness of the issue, no court has yet addressed whether a 
fee-shifting bylaw is void under the anti-waiver provisions as applied to 
federal securities law claims. I believe the answer is yes, at least with 
respect to stockholders with negative value claims, because a fee-shifting 
bylaw weakens their ability to recover under federal securities law, the 
standard established by the Supreme Court for determining the scope of 
sections 14 and 29(a). Specifically, the only sensible way for a stockholder 
with a negative value claim to recover under federal securities laws is by 
participating in a class action lawsuit. However, as discussed above, if the 
typical fee-shifting bylaw is applicable to securities law claims, no one 
will be willing to serve as lead plaintiff in a class action. Thus, no class 
action will be brought, and therefore negative value claim stockholders 
will have no recourse.
125
 In other words, their ability to recover under 
federal securities laws will have been weakened to the point of death. At 
 
 
 120. Id. at 234. 
 121. Id. 
 122. 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 484–85 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976)). 
 125. I note that the Court rejected this line of argument in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333 (2011), and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
These cases, however, are not on point. AT&T Mobility dealt with whether the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) preempted a California law prohibiting class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts. 
Likewise, American Express dealt with whether a class arbitration waiver falls within the “effective 
vindication” exception to the FAA. In other words, neither of them dealt with whether a contractual 
provision that essentially bans securities fraud class actions violates the anti-waiver provisions of 
federal securities laws. 
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the same time, there is no federal policy generally favoring fee-shifting, 
nor is fee-shifting subject to SEC authority, as is the case with arbitration. 
Thus, McMahon and Rodriguez are easily distinguishable. 
I view a fee-shifting bylaw somewhat analogous to the “no-action 
clause” at issue in McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc.,126 
which the court found was void under sections 14 and 29(a). In this 1995 
case, plaintiffs purchased debentures issued by Wherehouse Entertainment 
in a registered offering.
127
 Plaintiffs later claimed that the related 
registration statements and prospectus were materially misleading, and 
thus sued Wherehouse Entertainment and related parties under section 11 
of the Securities Act and § 10/Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.
128
 In a 
motion for summary judgment, defendants asserted, among other things, 
that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the no-action clause of the indenture 
governing the debentures.
129
 This clause provided as follows: 
Limitation on Suits. A Securityholder may pursue any remedy with 
respect to this Indenture or the Securities only if: 
(1) the Holder gives to the [Indenture] Trustee written notice of 
a continuing Event of Default; 
(2) the Holders of at least 25% in principal amount of the 
Securities make a written request to the Trustee to pursue the 
remedy; 
(3) such Holder or Holders offer to the Trustee indemnity 
satisfactory to the Trustee against any loss, liability or expense; 
(4) the Trustee does not comply with the request within 60 days 
after receipt of the request and the offer of indemnity; and 
(5) during such 60-day period the Holders of a majority in 
principal amount of the Securities do not give the Trustee a 
direction inconsistent with the request.
130
 
As the court noted, “[s]uch no-action clauses frequently are included in 
indentures to limit suits arising from those agreements.”131  
 
 
 126. 65 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 127. Id. at 1045. 
 128. Id. at 1047. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1050 (footnote omitted). 
 131. Id. 
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The district court acknowledged that plaintiffs failed to comply with 
the no-action clause but nonetheless denied defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on the federal securities law claims.
132
 It ruled that the 
no-action clause was inoperable as applied to these claims under sections 
14 and 29(a) “because it infringed on plaintiffs’ substantive rights under 
the securities laws.”133 Defendants argued on appeal that the no-action 
clause is analogous to an arbitration clause in that it “does not constitute a 
‘waiver,’ but, rather, establishes a procedure that must be followed before 
an action may be brought.”134 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, 
reasoning: 
Arbitration clauses are enforceable under federal securities laws 
because they are procedural in nature and do not serve to waive 
compliance with the provisions of substantive law. The no-action 
clause in this case can operate to bar a minority plaintiff class from 
exercising its substantive rights under federal securities law upon 
the vote of a majority of the debentureholders. Further, a plaintiff's 
inability to indemnify the Trustee, as required by the no-action 
clause here, would bar that plaintiff from commencing a securities 
law claim. The statutory framework of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 
compels the conclusion that individual securityholders may not be 
forced to forego their rights under the federal securities laws due to 
a contract provision. Thus, the district court properly found that 
actions based on federal securities laws may not be precluded by the 
no-action clause.
135
 
I view the “minority plaintiff class” referenced by the court as akin to a 
negative value claim plaintiff class and the Trustee indemnification 
requirement akin to a fee-shifting obligation. 
B. Federal Preemption 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that 
the Constitution, and the laws passed by Congress pursuant to it, are “the 
supreme Law of the Land.”136 Thus, federal law overrides, or preempts, 
 
 
 132. Id. at 1051. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (citations omitted). 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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conflicting state law.
137
 Courts have developed an extensive body of case 
law delineating various categories of preemption. Among these categories 
are “impossibility preemption,” which applies when “compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,”138 and 
“obstacle preemption,” which applies when “state law ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’”139 I discuss applicability of these preemption 
doctrines to fee-shifting bylaws below. Note that my discussion is limited 
to the preemption of fee-shifting bylaws as applied to stockholder claims 
brought under federal securities law. In other words, the discussion is not 
relevant to fee-shifting bylaws as applied to state law claims. 
As a threshold issue, a fee-shifting bylaw, as mentioned above, is 
considered contractual in nature, and one normally thinks of preemption in 
terms of a state law, not a contractual provision, conflicting with a federal 
law. Courts and commentators, however, have long recognized that federal 
law can preempt a contractual provision that is valid under state law.
140
 
1. Impossibility Preemption 
The case for impossibility preemption is based on the fact that both the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act have provisions addressing the 
payment of attorney’s fees. Specifically, section 11(e)(3) of the Securities 
Act provides: 
In any suit under this or any other section of [the Securities Act] . . . 
if judgment shall be rendered against a party litigant, upon the 
motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be assessed in 
favor of such party litigant . . . if the court believes the suit or the 
defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to 
reimburse him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in 
connection with such suit . . . .
141
  
 
 
 137. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 203–04 (1983). 
 138. Id. at 204 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963)). 
 139. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
 140. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 
395 U.S. 653, 673–74 (1969); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32–33 (1964); Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117); see also generally Christina 
Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond 
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1999). 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2014). 
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Congress added this provision to the Securities Act in 1934 in an effort to 
deter strike/nuisance suits.
142
 Courts have interpreted the “without merit” 
standard to encompass “claims and defenses that . . . border on the 
frivolous.”143 It is within a court’s discretion to determine whether this 
standard is met.
144
 
Congress again took up the award of attorney’s fees in federal 
securities fraud claims in 1995 as part of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”).145 The PSLRA amended the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act with the twin goals of “curb[ing] frivolous, lawyer-
driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on 
meritorious claims.”146 Regarding attorney’s fees, the PSLRA added 
section 27(c) to the Securities Act and section 21D(c) to the Exchange 
Act. These are parallel provisions that require a court to (1) assess 
compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) by the parties and 
their attorneys upon final adjudication of any private action under the 
specific act, and (2) presumptively award a party reasonable attorney’s 
fees and other expenses incurred in the action if it finds that the opposing 
party has failed to comply.
147
 These changes are viewed as amendments to, 
and partial repeal of, Rule 11 exclusively for private securities fraud 
litigation.
148
 The changes, among other things, impose fee-shifting, a 
notion disfavored by Rule 11.
149
 As the PSLRA conference report 
explains: 
Existing Rule 11 has not deterred abusive securities litigation. 
Courts often fail to impose Rule 11 sanctions even where such 
sanctions are warranted. When sanctions are awarded, they are 
generally insufficient to make whole the victim of a Rule 11 
violation: the amount of the sanction is limited to an amount that the 
court deems sufficient to deter repetition of the sanctioned conduct, 
 
 
 142. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975); see also Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.30 (1976). 
 143. Layman v. Combs, 994 F.2d 1344, 1353 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting W. Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 
739 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 144. See, e.g., Rucker v. La-Co, Inc., 496 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 145. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 146. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 
 147. Securities Act of 1933 § 27(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2014); Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(c), 
15 U.S.C. § 78-u4 (2014). 
 148. See, e.g., JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., JENNER & BLOCK, PRACTICE SERIES: SANCTIONS 
UNDER RULE 11 6 (2010), available at http://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/5514/original/ 
Sanctions_20Under_20Rule_2011-Complete_2010.pdf?1323114005. 
 149. Id. at 11. 
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rather than imposing a sanction that equals the costs imposed on the 
victim by the violation. Finally, courts have been unable to apply 
Rule 11 to the complaint in such a way that the victim of the 
ensuing lawsuit is compensated for all attorney’s fees and costs 
incurred in the entire action.
150
 
As a general matter, a party violates Rule 11(b) if a court determines a 
claim the party has brought is frivolous.
151
 
Congress left Securities Act section 11(e)(3) in place even though 
section 27(c) overlaps with it. Perhaps they did this because arguably 
section 11(e)(3) provides a court more latitude to impose fee-shifting 
because of the “borders on frivolous standard.” The big difference 
between the two sections is that section 27(c) provides the court less 
discretion in that it imposes a presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s 
fees, which is not the case under section 11(e)(3).  
The bottom line is that even under the stricter PSLRA attorney’s fees 
provisions, it is ultimately up to the court to determine whether fee-
shifting is warranted in a particular securities fraud case based on its 
assessment of the merits. Conversely, a typical fee-shifting bylaw removes 
a court’s assessment of the merits from the equation because it simply 
mandates fee-shifting regardless of the merits if plaintiff “does not obtain 
a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and 
amount, the full remedy sought.”152 
It is this discretion/no-discretion distinction that is at the crux of an 
impossibility preemption argument because courts have held under the 
doctrine that federal law which affords a decision maker discretion 
overrides state law which takes away that discretion.
153
 For example, the 
court addressed the issue in Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. 
Grunwald.
154
 The case involved a clash between National Association of 
Securities Dealers (“NASD”) arbitration rules and California’s Ethics 
Standards for neutral arbitrators.
155
 After determining that NASD rules 
approved by the SEC have preemptive force over conflicting state law, the 
 
 
 150. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (footnote omitted). 
 151. See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1448 
(11th Cir. 1998). 
 152. See, e.g., Insys Therapeutics, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Nov. 10, 2014). 
 153. See, e.g., Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1133 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Bloemendaal v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, No. EDCV 10–1455 DSF (PLAx), 2011 WL 
2161352, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2011), aff'd sub nom. McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Invs., LLC, 717 
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 154. 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 155. Id. at 1121. 
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court turned to whether NASD rules for arbitration disqualification 
overrode those of California under the doctrine of impossibility 
preemption.
156
  
Specifically, California’s Ethics Standards provide for mandatory and 
automatic disqualification of an arbitrator who fails to make a required 
disclosure if a party serves a timely notice of disqualification.
157
 
Conversely, the NASD Code provides that the NASD Director of 
Arbitration “may” remove an arbitrator who has failed to make a required 
disclosure.
158
 As the court summed things up, “[t]hus, in the event of a 
failure to make a required disclosure, the California Ethics Standards 
require disqualification once a party serves a notice of disqualification, 
while the NASD Code grants discretion to the NASD Director of 
Arbitration to decide whether the arbitrator should be disqualified.”159 As a 
result: 
The NASD Director of Arbitration would find himself in a catch-22 
if the California Ethics Standards applied to NASD arbitrations. If 
the NASD Director exercises his discretion under the NASD Code 
by refusing to dismiss an arbitrator that failed to make a required 
disclosure, the Director violates the California Ethics Standards’ 
mandatory disqualification provision. Alternatively, if the Director 
determines that he is bound by the California Ethics Standards, he 
effectively forfeits his discretionary authority under the NASD 
Code.
160
 
Hence, the court concluded that “[a]pplication of the California Ethics 
Standards to NASD arbitrations would strip the Director of Arbitration of 
his federally-recognized obligation to make a determination whether an 
arbitrator should in fact be disqualified. Because the NASD Director 
cannot comply with both sets of disqualification rules, the California 
Ethics Standards are preempted.”161 
The rule clash at issue in Credit Suisse is no different than the clash 
between a fee-shifting bylaw and federal securities laws. A court would 
find itself in a catch-22 if a fee-shifting bylaw applied to federal securities 
 
 
 156. Id. at 1133. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.; see also UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION § 10308(d)(2) (2007) (“[T]he Director may 
remove an arbitrator from an arbitration panel based on information that is required to be disclosed 
pursuant to Rule 10312 and that was not previously disclosed.”). 
 159. Credit Suisse, 400 F.3d at 1133. 
 160. Id. (citations omitted). 
 161. Id. at 1134. 
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law claims. If the court exercises its discretion under Securities Act 
section 11(e)(3) or 27(c) or Exchange Act section 21D(c), by choosing not 
to award attorney’s fees in a case where a plaintiff failed to obtain a 
judgment for the full remedy sought, the court violates the bylaw’s 
mandatory fee-shifting language. Alternatively, if the court determines that 
it is bound by the fee-shifting bylaw, it effectively forfeits its discretionary 
authority under federal securities laws. In other words, application of a 
fee-shifting bylaw would strip the court of its federally-recognized 
obligation to make a determination whether attorney’s fees should in fact 
be awarded. Thus, under the reasoning of Credit Suisse, federal securities 
law preempts fee-shifting bylaws. 
2. Obstacle Preemption 
As mentioned above, obstacle preemption arises when “state law 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”162 Per the Supreme Court: 
What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed 
by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its 
purpose and intended effects . . . . If the purpose of the act cannot 
otherwise be accomplished—if its operation within its chosen field 
else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural 
effect—the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within 
the sphere of its delegated power.”163 
In my judgment, a fee-shifting bylaw frustrates the purpose of the PSLRA 
and is therefore invalid under the doctrine of obstacle preemption. In that 
regard, below is some background on the PSLRA. 
Securities antifraud provisions are designed to deter erroneous 
disclosure and provide a compensation avenue to wronged investors. They 
also supplement public enforcement of federal securities laws by enabling 
plaintiffs to serve as “private attorneys general,” an important 
consideration given the resource constraints of the SEC.
164
 The provisions, 
 
 
 162. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 
(1983) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 163. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 
225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 164. Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on 
Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330, 338 
(2008) (footnotes omitted) (“[E]mpirical studies make clear that the SEC cannot investigate and bring 
enforcement actions against all corporate wrongdoers; the concept of the private plaintiffs acting as a 
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however, are subject to abuse, especially when it comes to class action 
litigation. Specifically, plaintiffs’ firms have long been accused of 
bringing unmeritorious securities fraud claims, or strike suits. The story 
goes that plaintiffs’ firms bring strike suits because of their nuisance 
value. They figure a company is likely to settle the suit regardless of the 
merits to avoid the expense, uncertainty, and disruption of protracted 
litigation.
165
 Thus, they recruit a stockholder to serve as lead plaintiff, file 
suit, and then negotiate a settlement with the company that includes a nice 
payment to the plaintiffs’ firm for its time and expense in bringing the suit.  
This dynamic was behind Congress’s enactment of the PSLRA, which, 
as mentioned above, amended the Securities Act and the Exchange Act in 
an effort to curb frivolous securities suits.
166
 In addition to the attorney’s 
fees provisions, these amendments also included the following: 
 Heightened pleading standards. In addition to pleading fraud 
with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b), the PSLRA requires a Rule 10b-5 complaint to “specify 
each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or 
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation 
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and 
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on 
which that belief is formed.”167 Further, the complaint must also 
“state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind [i.e., 
scienter].”168  
 Lead plaintiff and class counsel selection. The PSLRA requires 
the court to appoint the lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class 
action, presumptively the investor with the largest financial 
 
 
‘private attorney general’ as a necessary supplement to the SEC’s enforcement powers maintains its 
vitality.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Selby P. Brown, Comment, Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath Water: The 
Merits of the Intermediate Approach to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 66 OKLA. L. 
REV. 363, 370 (2014). 
 166. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313–14, 322 (2007). 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2014). 
 168. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). The PSLRA, did not, however, specify what constitutes a “strong 
inference.” The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
ruling that in order to qualify as “strong,” “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible 
or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of 
nonfraudulent intent.” 551 U.S. at 314. 
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interest in the case.
169
 The lead plaintiff is then charged with 
selecting class counsel, subject to court approval.
170
 
 Discovery stay. The PSLRA imposes a stay on discovery during 
the pendency of a defendant’s motion to dismiss.171 
As the PSLRA Conference Report explains: 
 The overriding purpose of our Nation’s securities laws is to 
protect investors and to maintain confidence in the securities 
markets, so that our national savings, capital formation and 
investment may grow for the benefit of all Americans. 
 The private securities litigation system is too important to the 
integrity of American capital markets to allow this system to be 
undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing 
abusive and meritless suits. Private securities litigation is an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their 
losses without having to rely upon government action. Such private 
lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital 
markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that 
corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly 
perform their jobs. This legislation seeks to return the securities 
litigation system to that high standard.
172
 
With respect to the PSLRA provisions addressing the award of attorney’s 
fees, the conference report states as follows: 
 The Conference Committee recognizes the need to reduce 
significantly the filing of meritless securities lawsuits without 
hindering the ability of victims of fraud to pursue legitimate claims. 
The Conference Committee seeks to solve this problem by 
strengthening the application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in private securities actions.
173
 
Thus, both the PSLRA generally and the attorney’s fees provisions 
specifically reflect a deliberate and careful balancing by Congress to 
 
 
 169. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B), 78u-4(a)(3)(B). 
 170. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
 171. §§ 77z-1(b)(1); 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 172. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 173. Id. at 39. 
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preserve private securities fraud lawsuits while reducing abusive and 
meritless suits.
174
 
Simply put, a fee-shifting bylaw upsets the balance struck by Congress 
and therefore frustrates the purpose of the PSLRA. It upsets this balance 
because, as discussed in Part III above, the likely effect of a fee-shifting 
bylaw would be to eliminate securities fraud class actions and decrease 
individual actions regardless of merit. In other words, fee-shifting bylaws, 
if enforceable, would greatly hinder the ability of victims of fraud to 
pursue legitimate claims, in stark contrast to the stated goals of the 
PSLRA. Hence, a fee-shifting bylaw “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress”175 and is therefore invalid under the doctrine of obstacle 
preemption. 
C. Validity of Less One-Sided Fee-Shifting Bylaws 
The fee-shifting bylaw analyzed above is extremely one-sided in favor 
of the corporation as discussed in Part I.C. Hence, this section considers 
whether a corporation could craft a less one-sided, or more fair, fee-
shifting bylaw that would not violate the anti-waiver provisions of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act or be preempted by federal law. 
My anti-waiver and obstacle preemption arguments are both based 
largely on the high probability that the typical fee-shifting bylaw would 
eliminate securities fraud class actions. Thus, tweaking the language of the 
bylaw so that it has less of an impact on a stockholder’s cost-benefit 
analysis for serving as a lead plaintiff would be a way around these 
arguments. For example, a corporation could provide for two-sided fee-
shifting and not require the prevailing party to substantially achieve the 
full remedy sought, similar to the Oklahoma fee-shifting statutory 
provision discussed in Part I.C. above. The problem with this approach, 
 
 
 174. Congress did in fact consider going with a more defendant-favorable rule but nothing as 
extreme as what the typical fee-shifting bylaw imposes. Specifically, an earlier version of the PSLRA 
contained a provision imposing the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees on a losing party if the court 
determines “(A) the position of the losing party was not substantially justified, (B) imposing fees and 
expenses on the losing party or the losing party's attorney would be just, and (C) the cost of such fees 
and expenses to the prevailing party is substantially burdensome or unjust.” Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 3(a) (1995) (House engrossed version Mar. 
8, 1995). It ultimately, however, decided to go with the Rule 11 approach. See generally Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, 
and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 322–27 (1998) (discussing legislative history of 
the PSLRA). 
 175. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 
(1983) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
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however, is that it would severely undercut the deterrent effect of a fee-
shifting bylaw on securities fraud class actions and derivative suits, which 
likely is a corporation’s primary, if not only, reason for adopting a fee-
shifting bylaw. 
My impossibility preemption argument is based on the fact that the 
typical fee-shifting bylaw overrides a court’s discretion to award or not 
award fees depending on the case’s merits. Thus, a corporation could 
sidestep the issue by building such discretion into the language of the 
bylaw. Such an approach, however, would mean that whether fee-shifting 
is warranted in a particular securities fraud case is ultimately up to the 
court, which is no different than the rule applicable to a corporation 
without a fee-shifting bylaw. In other words, adopting such a fee-shifting 
bylaw would be pointless. 
The bottom line is that a corporation could adopt a fee-shifting bylaw 
that would pass muster under federal securities laws. Doing so, however, 
would be senseless because the bylaw would be largely toothless and 
would not change the status quo. 
V. SHOULD CONGRESS VALIDATE FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS? 
Congress could, of course, amend the securities laws to validate the 
typical fee-shifting bylaw. This Part explains why it should not do so. 
Given the current political climate in Washington, I view the discussion 
that follows as largely academic. 
As recognized by the Delaware Supreme Court in ATP, the purpose 
behind the typical fee-shifting bylaw is to deter litigation.
176
 Hence, 
Congress should validate typical fee-shifting bylaws only if it concludes 
that (1) there is too much securities fraud litigation and (2) typical fee-
shifting bylaws are the most sensible way to deal with the problem. An 
obvious claim for condition (1) being met is that notwithstanding the 
passage of the PSLRA, there are still too many frivolous securities fraud 
class action suits being brought. Even if this claim is true, however, it fails 
condition (2) for several reasons. First, as discussed above, a typical fee-
shifting bylaw deters all securities fraud class actions, regardless of merit, 
not just frivolous class actions.  
 
 
 176. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (2014). 
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Second, the antifraud provisions apply to transactions in securities,
177
 a 
term that includes stock, bonds, debentures, and options, among others.
178
 
Conversely, the typical fee-shifting bylaw applies only to stockholders.
179
 
Even if written more broadly, a typical fee-shifting bylaw would not apply 
to non-stockholders because bylaws are a contract between the corporation 
and its stockholders.
180
 In other words, a non-stockholder is not bound by 
a corporation’s bylaws. Thus, a typical fee-shifting bylaw would not deter 
frivolous class actions brought by holders of securities other than stock. 
Similarly, the typical fee-shifting bylaw applies only to suits against a 
corporation or a corporation’s officer, director, or affiliate and therefore 
would not deter frivolous class actions against underwriters and 
accounting firms under section 11 of the Securities Act.
181
 
Hence, validating typical fee-shifting bylaws to combat frivolous 
litigation would be both over- and under-inclusive. A more sensible 
approach would be one targeted exclusively to frivolous litigation that 
covers suits by all types of securities holders, not just stockholders, and all 
types of defendants, not just corporations and their affiliates. Such an 
approach could include, for example, giving a court more latitude to 
dismiss claims it views as frivolous. 
Some commentators have gone further and argued, albeit in a different 
context, that the problem is not frivolous securities fraud class actions, but 
all securities fraud class actions.
182
 The crux of the argument is that these 
suits, even if meritorious, neither effectively deter fraud
183
 nor effectively 
compensate those harmed by fraud.
184
 At the same time, they generate 
enormous amounts of legal fees and expenses, most of which are covered 
 
 
 177. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2014) (referring to “any person acquiring such security”); see 
also § 77l(a)(2) (referring to a person who “offers or sells a security”). 
 178. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2014). 
 179. See discussion supra Part I.C.  
 180. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (“[T]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among 
the directors, officers, and stockholders . . . .”). 
 181. See discussion supra Part I.C.  
 182. See, e.g., PINCUS, supra note 95, at 2.  
 183. Securities fraud class actions allegedly do not effectively deter fraud because individual 
wrongdoers, as opposed to their corporate employers, are almost never held accountable. See id. at 3. 
 184. They allegedly do not effectively compensate those harmed by fraud because it is the 
corporation, and thus indirectly its shareholders, who pays any resulting settlement or judgment to a 
subset of its shareholders (those who bought or sold during the class period), and thus indirectly its 
shareholders pay any resulting settlement or judgment. Since a diversified shareholder will sometimes 
be in the class and other times not in the class, any recovery it gets will likely be cancelled out by 
money it indirectly lost when it was not in the class, especially when litigation costs and expenses are 
factored in. See id; see also William W. Bratton & Michael L.Wachter, The Political Economy of 
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 93–97 (2011).  
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directly or indirectly by corporate America. Hence, the costs simply 
outweigh the benefits. As a result, securities fraud class actions, it is 
argued, should be abolished, especially considering that the strongest 
deterrence comes from governmental enforcement, which would remain in 
place. 
Even if Congress were to conclude that the costs of securities fraud 
class actions outweigh the benefits (a topic beyond the scope of this 
Article), addressing the problem by validating typical fee-shifting bylaws 
would fail condition (2). A more direct and sensible approach in such an 
alternate reality would be to amend the securities laws to allow 
corporations to opt out of securities fraud class actions
185
 as opposed to 
letting them do so indirectly and imperfectly through fee-shifting bylaws. 
In other words, even if the costs truly do outweigh the benefits—a 
contestable point
186—it still would not make sense for Congress to validate 
fee-shifting bylaws. 
The bottom line is that if Congress were to once again address 
securities fraud class actions, validating typical fee-shifting bylaws would 
not be a prudent approach. I suspect proponents of typical fee-shifting 
bylaws as a solution to securities fraud class actions run amok would 
agree, at least privately, since all potential fixes would be on the table if 
Congress were open to amending the Securities Act and Exchange Act. 
Nonetheless, it is not surprising that business interests strongly support 
fee-shifting bylaws even though the problem that needs to be cured is both 
unclear and contestable and the fix is far short of perfect because it is a 
“fix” that is currently on the table. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The typical fee-shifting bylaw seemingly applies to federal securities 
fraud claims brought by stockholders because such claims fall squarely 
within the bylaw’s language. Such application would drastically change 
the cost-benefit analysis of serving as lead plaintiff in a securities fraud 
class action, making it highly unlikely that anyone would agree to serve. 
The result would be that corporations could essentially opt out of 
securities fraud class actions. 
 
 
 185. To be clear, I am not advocating that Congress do this. All I am saying is that even in an 
alternate reality, it would not make sense for Congress to do so. 
 186. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 807–20. 
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Typical fee-shifting bylaws, however, are invalid as applied to federal 
securities fraud claims. Specifically, such application violates the anti-
waiver provisions of federal securities law and the Supremacy Clause 
under the doctrines of impossibility and obstacle preemption. Congress, of 
course, could amend federal securities law to validate typical fee-shifting 
bylaws, but it should not do so because better fixes are possible.  
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APPENDIX 
The below table lists corporations (with the exception of Alibaba) that 
have adopted fee-shifting bylaws or charter provisions between May 8, 
2014, the date the court released its opinion in ATP, and March 16, 2015. 
The “Notes” column specifies notable departures from the language of the 
ITI fee-shifting bylaw discussed in Part I.C. A blank Notes box means no 
notable differences. Some basic statistics follow the table. 
Name Jurisdiction of 
Incorporation 
Notes 
Air Industries Group187 Nevada Requires claiming party to bear its 
own litigation costs and prohibits 
claiming party and its attorneys from 
receiving fees or expenses from a 
common fund or a corporate benefit 
conferred on the corporation 
Alibaba Group Holding 
Limited188 
Cayman Islands Does not include “substantially 
achieve . . . full remedy sought” 
limitation 
American Spectrum Realty, 
Inc.189 
Maryland  
ATD Corporation190 Delaware Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine 
Barnwell Industries, Inc.191 Delaware Requires claiming party to bear its 
own litigation costs and prohibits 
claiming party and its attorneys from 
receiving fees or expenses from a 
common fund or a corporate benefit 
conferred on the corporation 
BBX Capital Corporation192 Florida  
BFC Financial 
Corporation193 
Florida  
Biolase, Inc.194 Delaware Applies only to claims brought by 
current or former directors 
 
 
 187. Air Indus. Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Oct. 22, 2014). 
 188. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., Amendment No. 6 to Form F-1 Registration Statement (Form F-
1/A), at exhibit 3.2 (Sept. 5, 2014).  
 189. Am. Spectrum Realty, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (July 25, 2014).  
 190. ATD Corp., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at exhibit 
3.2 (Aug. 19, 2014). 
 191. Barnwell Indus., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at exhibit 3.2 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 192. BBX Capital Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
 193. BFC Fin. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
 194. Biolase, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (June 30, 2014). 
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Name Jurisdiction of 
Incorporation 
Notes 
Bridgeline Digital, Inc.195 Delaware Requires claiming party to bear its 
own litigation costs and prohibits 
claiming party and its attorneys from 
receiving fees or expenses from a 
common fund or a corporate benefit 
conferred on the corporation 
Cadista Holdings Inc.196 Delaware  
CIG Wireless Corp.197 Nevada Corporation can require a less than 
5% shareholder plaintiff to provide 
surety for expenses 
Cogent Communications 
Holdings, Inc.198 
Delaware Requires claiming party to bear its 
own litigation costs and prohibits 
claiming party and its attorneys from 
receiving fees or expenses from a 
common fund or a corporate benefit 
conferred on the corporation 
CoLucid Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.199 
Delaware  
Cryo-Cell International, 
Inc.200 
Delaware Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine 
Echo Therapeutics, Inc.201 Delaware  
Epiq Systems, Inc.202 Missouri Applies only to claims brought in a 
forum other than the Jackson County 
Missouri Circuit Court, or, if such 
court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri; 
does not include “substantially 
achieve . . . full remedy sought” 
limitation 
Evolent Health, Inc.203 Delaware Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine 
FDO Holdings, Inc.204 Delaware Charter provision 
 
 
 195. Bridgeline Digital, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at exhibit 3.2 (Feb. 17, 2015). 
 196. Cadista Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Oct. 8, 2014). 
 197. CIG Wireless Corp., Current Report (Form 10-Q), at exhibit 3.1 (Nov. 14, 2014). 
 198. Cogent Commc’ns Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (Nov. 5, 2014). 
 199. CoLucid Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at exhibit 3.2 (Mar. 30, 
2015). 
 200. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (Sept. 26, 2014). 
 201. Echo Therapeutics, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (July 29, 2014). 
 202. Epiq Sys., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Oct. 8, 2014). 
 203. Evolent Health, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (June 10, 2015). 
 204. FDO Holdings, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), 41 (Nov. 7, 2014). 
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Name Jurisdiction of 
Incorporation 
Notes 
First Aviation Services, 
Inc.205 
Delaware  
Frequency Electronics, 
Inc.206 
Delaware  
Freshpet, Inc.207 Delaware Charter provision; limited to claims 
falling within internal affairs 
doctrine 
GAMCO Investors, Inc.208 Delaware  
GWG Holdings, Inc.209 Delaware  
Hemispherx Biopharma, 
Inc.210 
Delaware Corporation can require a less than 
5% shareholder to provide surety for 
expenses 
Highlands Bankshares, 
Inc.211 
Virginia Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine 
IDI, Inc. (f/k/a Tiger Media, 
Inc.)212 
Delaware Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine 
Informatica Corporation213 Delaware Applies only to claims filed in a 
court outside of Delaware 
Insys Therapeutics, Inc.214 Delaware  
Interactive Brokers Group, 
Inc.215 
Delaware Does not include “substantially 
achieve . . . full remedy sought” 
limitation 
Iradimed Corporation216 Delaware  
Juno Therapeutics, Inc.217 Delaware  
KLX Inc.218 Delaware  
Lannett Company, Inc.219 Delaware  
   
 
 
 205. Strougo v. Hollander, 111 A.3d 590, 592 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
 206. Frequency Elecs., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 207. Freshpet, Inc., Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), 32–33 
(Nov. 4, 2014).  
 208. GAMCO Investors, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.3 (Sept. 26, 2014). 
 209. GWG Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at exhibit 3.1 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
 210. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (June 24, 2015). 
 211. Highlands Bankshares, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Nov. 18, 2014).  
 212. Tiger Media, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.3 (Mar. 26, 2015). 
 213. Informatica Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Apr. 7, 2015). 
 214. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Nov. 10, 2014). 
 215. Interactive Brokers Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Dec. 22, 2014). 
 216. Iradimed Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (Dec. 16, 2014). 
 217. Juno Therapeutics, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A), at exhibit 3.2 (Dec. 9, 
2014). 
 218. KLX Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (Dec. 19, 2014). 
 219. Lannett Co., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at exhibit 3.6 (Aug. 29, 2014). 
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Name Jurisdiction of 
Incorporation 
Notes 
The LGL Group, Inc.220 Delaware Requires claiming party to bear its 
own litigation costs and prohibits 
claiming party and its attorneys from 
receiving fees or expenses from a 
common fund or a corporate benefit 
conferred on the corporation 
Marine Products 
Corporation221 
Delaware Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine; does not 
include “substantially achieve . . . 
full remedy sought” limitation 
Mongolia Holdings, Inc.222 Delaware  
Nature’s Sunshine Products, 
Inc.223 
Utah  
Net Element, Inc.224 Delaware Requires claiming party to bear its 
own litigation costs and prohibits 
claiming party and its attorneys from 
receiving fees or expenses from a 
common fund or a corporate benefit 
conferred on the corporation 
Odyssey Marine 
Exploration225 
Nevada  
Planet Fitness, Inc.226 Delaware Charter provision; applies only to 
claims filed in a court outside of 
Delaware 
Plasmatech 
Biopharmaceuticals Inc.227 
Delaware Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine 
PRA Group, Inc.228 Delaware  
Press Ganey Holdings, 
Inc.229 
Delaware Charter provision; limited to claims 
falling within internal affairs 
doctrine 
PrimeEnergy Corporation230 Delaware Requires claiming party to bear its 
own litigation costs and prohibits 
 
 
 220. LGL Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (June 17, 2014). 
 221. Marine Products Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at exhibit 3.2 (Nov. 3, 2014).  
 222. Mong. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Nov. 25, 2014). 
 223. Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Aug. 29, 2014). 
 224. Net Element, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (June 16, 2015). 
 225. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.3 (Mar. 13, 
2015). 
 226. Planet Fitness, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at exhibit 3.1 (June 22, 2015). 
 227. PlasmaTech Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Mar. 4, 
2015). 
 228. PRA Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (Oct. 29, 2014). 
 229. Press Ganey Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (May 27, 2015). 
 230. PrimeEnergy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.2 (May 22, 2015). 
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Name Jurisdiction of 
Incorporation 
Notes 
claiming party and its attorneys from 
receiving fees or expenses from a 
common fund or a corporate benefit 
conferred on the corporation 
Riverbed Technology, 
Inc.231 
Delaware Limited to claims falling within 
internal affairs doctrine and brought 
in a court located outside of 
Delaware 
Rollins, Inc.232 Delaware Does not include “substantially 
achieve . . . full remedy sought” 
limitation 
RPC, Inc.233 Delaware Does not include “substantially 
achieve . . . full remedy sought” 
limitation 
Smart & Final Stores, 
Inc.234 
Delaware Charter provision 
Stemcells, Inc.235 Delaware  
Townsquare Media, Inc.236 Delaware Charter provision; limited to claims 
falling within internal affairs 
doctrine 
Western Capital Resources, 
Inc.237 
Minnesota  
  
 
 
 231. Riverbed Tech., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.1 (Dec. 15, 2014). 
 232. Rollins, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at exhibit 3.1 (Oct. 29, 2014).  
 233. RPC, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at exhibit 3.2 (Nov. 3, 2014). 
 234. Smart & Final Stores, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A), at exhibit 3.1 
(Sept. 19, 2014). 
 235. Stemcells, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 3.(II) (Oct. 23, 2015). 
 236. Townsquare Media, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at exhibit 3.1 (July 14, 2014). 
 237. W. Capital Res., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at exhibit 3.2 (Aug. 12, 2014). 
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Total number of corporations:  51 
Total number of jurisdictions: 9 
 
Jurisdiction breakdown 
Delaware 40 
Nevada 3 
Florida 2 
Cayman Islands 1 
Maryland 1 
Minnesota 1 
Missouri 1 
Virginia 1 
Utah 1 
 
Bylaws vs. Charter breakdown 
Bylaws 45 
Charter 6 
Internal affairs only:  11 
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